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Productividad del desarrollador

Security and Hardening

Addy OsmaniMITIdioma del Skill: Inglés
Licencia verificadaSin scriptsRiesgo bajo
DemostraciónEjecución real · claude-sonnet-5-5 · octubre de 2026
Please review this Express handler for security problems and show me the fixed version. It is a login plus avatar-upload endpoint in a small web app (sample code, not a real system). ```js const express = require('express'); const cors = require('cors'); const app = express(); app.use(cors({ origin: '*', credentials: true })); app.use(express.json()); app.post('/login', async (req, res) => { const { email, password } = req.body; const user = await db.query(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = '${email}'`); if (user.rows[0] && user.rows[0].password === password) { const token = jwt.sign({ id: user.rows[0].id }, 'secret123'); res.json({ token, user: user.rows[0] }); } else { res.status(401).json({ error: 'bad login', detail: `no user ${email}` }); } }); app.post('/avatar', upload.single('file'), (req, res) => { fs.writeFileSync('/var/www/uploads/' + req.file.originalname, req.file.buffer); res.send('ok'); }); app.get('/profile/:id', async (req, res) => { res.json((await db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ' + req.params.id)).rows[0]); }); // the front end stores the token in localStorage ```
Skill: security-and-hardening

Review: security problems found

# Severity Problem
1 Critical SQL injection in /login and /profile/:id, from string-concatenated queries.
2 Critical Path traversal and arbitrary file overwrite in /avatar. originalname is attacker-controlled, so ../../x escapes the folder.
3 Critical Uploads are unauthenticated and unrestricted. There is no size, type, or content check. The files go into /var/www, so an uploaded .html or .svg gives stored XSS, and a script file may get executed.
4 High Plaintext password comparison. Passwords are stored unhashed and compared with ===, which is also not timing-safe.
5 High Hardcoded JWT secret ('secret123'). There is no expiry and the algorithm isn't pinned, so anyone can forge tokens.
6 High Full DB row returned (SELECT *) from /login and /profile. This leaks the password and any other sensitive columns.
7 High /profile/:id has no authentication or authorization (IDOR). Anyone can read any user.
8 High Token in localStorage. Any XSS can steal it. Use an httpOnly cookie instead.
9 Medium cors({ origin: '*', credentials: true }) is a misconfiguration. Use an explicit allowlist.
10 Medium The 401 reply echoes the email (detail). That is reflected input and it enables user enumeration.
11 Medium No rate limiting on login, so brute force and credential stuffing are open.
12 Medium No input validation. email could be an object or array, not just a string.
13 Low No security headers (helmet).
14 Low Async errors are unhandled in Express 4, which gives hangs or stack traces. writeFileSync also blocks the event loop.

Fixed version

const express = require('express');
const cors = require('cors');
const helmet = require('helmet');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit');
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const multer = require('multer');
const crypto = require('crypto');
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs/promises');
const { z } = require('zod');

const JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
if (!JWT_SECRET || JWT_SECRET.length < 32) throw new Error('JWT_SECRET missing or too short');

const ALLOWED_ORIGINS = (process.env.CORS_ORIGINS || '').split(',').filter(Boolean);
const UPLOAD_DIR = path.resolve(process.env.UPLOAD_DIR || '/var/app-data/avatars'); // outside the web root
const DUMMY_HASH = bcrypt.hashSync('dummy-password', 12); // equalizes timing for unknown emails

const app = express();
app.use(helmet());
app.use(cors({ origin: ALLOWED_ORIGINS, credentials: true }));
app.use(express.json({ limit: '10kb' }));
app.use(cookieParser());

const wrap = fn => (req, res, next) => fn(req, res, next).catch(next);

// ---- auth middleware ----
function requireAuth(req, res, next) {
  try {
    const payload = jwt.verify(req.cookies.session, JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
    req.userId = payload.id;
    next();
  } catch {
    res.status(401).json({ error: 'unauthorized' });
  }
}

// ---- login ----
const loginLimiter = rateLimit({ windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, max: 10 }); // use a shared store (e.g. Redis) if you run >1 instance
const loginSchema = z.object({ email: z.string().email().max(254), password: z.string().min(1).max(200) });

app.post('/login', loginLimiter, wrap(async (req, res) => {
  const parsed = loginSchema.safeParse(req.body);
  if (!parsed.success) return res.status(422).json({ error: 'invalid input' });
  const { email, password } = parsed.data;

  const { rows } = await db.query(
    'SELECT id, email, display_name, password_hash FROM users WHERE email = $1', [email]);
  const user = rows[0];
  const ok = await bcrypt.compare(password, user ? user.password_hash : DUMMY_HASH);
  if (!user || !ok) return res.status(401).json({ error: 'invalid email or password' });

  const token = jwt.sign({ id: user.id }, JWT_SECRET, { algorithm: 'HS256', expiresIn: '1h' });
  res.cookie('session', token, {
    httpOnly: true, secure: true, sameSite: 'strict', maxAge: 60 * 60 * 1000,
  });
  res.json({ user: { id: user.id, email: user.email, displayName: user.display_name } });
}));

// ---- avatar upload ----
const upload = multer({
  storage: multer.memoryStorage(),
  limits: { fileSize: 2 * 1024 * 1024, files: 1 },
});

// verify real content via magic bytes; the extension and client MIME type prove nothing
function sniffImage(buf) {
  if (buf.length > 8 && buf.subarray(0, 8).equals(Buffer.from([0x89,0x50,0x4e,0x47,0x0d,0x0a,0x1a,0x0a]))) return 'png';
  if (buf.length > 3 && buf[0] === 0xff && buf[1] === 0xd8 && buf[2] === 0xff) return 'jpg';
  return null; // SVG and HTML deliberately not allowed
}

app.post('/avatar', requireAuth, upload.single('file'), wrap(async (req, res) => {
  if (!req.file) return res.status(422).json({ error: 'file required' });
  const ext = sniffImage(req.file.buffer);
  if (!ext) return res.status(415).json({ error: 'only PNG or JPEG allowed' });

  // server-chosen name: the client filename is never used
  const name = `${req.userId}-${crypto.randomUUID()}.${ext}`;
  const dest = path.join(UPLOAD_DIR, name);
  if (path.dirname(dest) !== UPLOAD_DIR) throw new Error('bad path'); // defense in depth
  await fs.writeFile(dest, req.file.buffer, { flag: 'wx', mode: 0o640 });

  await db.query('UPDATE users SET avatar_file = $1 WHERE id = $2', [name, req.userId]);
  res.json({ ok: true });
}));
// Serve avatars via a static handler or CDN with `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`
// and a fixed image Content-Type.

// ---- profile ----
app.get('/profile/:id', requireAuth, wrap(async (req, res) => {
  const id = Number.parseInt(req.params.id, 10);
  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(id)) return res.status(422).json({ error: 'invalid id' });
  if (id !== req.userId) return res.status(403).json({ error: 'forbidden' }); // add an admin check if needed

  const { rows } = await db.query(
    'SELECT id, email, display_name, avatar_file FROM users WHERE id = $1', [id]);
  if (!rows[0]) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'not found' });
  res.json(rows[0]);
}));

// ---- error handler: details go to logs, not to the client ----
app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
  console.error(err);
  res.status(500).json({ error: 'internal error' });
});

Notes on the changes

  • Passwords: your table needs a password_hash column. Migrate existing users by hashing their passwords with bcrypt (cost 12 or higher) or forcing a reset. Never keep the plaintext column.
  • Token storage: moving from localStorage to an httpOnly cookie means the front end must call fetch(..., { credentials: 'include' }) and stop touching the token. sameSite: 'strict' and the CORS allowlist cover CSRF for this setup. If the front end runs on a different site (not just a different subdomain), add CSRF tokens.
  • Secrets: JWT_SECRET comes from the environment. Treat secret123 as compromised and rotate it, since any tokens signed with it can be forged.
  • Rate limiting: the in-memory limiter works for a single process. With multiple instances, back it with Redis or similar, or the effective limit is 10 × instances.
  • Not covered: db, upload, jwt and fs were undefined in your sample, so I assumed pg-style $1 placeholders. I also didn't add account lockout, password policy, or logging of failed logins. Those are worth adding for a real system.

Test run: a deliberately vulnerable sample Express handler (login, upload, profile). The model listed 14 problems by severity and gave a fixed version. The fixed code was not run, and the model noted it assumed a pg-style database client. It did not open the bundled reference files in this run.

Qué hace

Considera que toda entrada externa es hostil y que todo secreto es sagrado. Empieza con un modelo de amenazas breve (mapear las fronteras de confianza, nombrar los activos, ejecutar STRIDE, escribir casos de abuso junto a los casos de uso) y luego aplica un conjunto de reglas de tres niveles: hacer siempre (validar la entrada, parametrizar las consultas, codificar la salida, aplicar hash a las contraseñas, proteger las cookies, ejecutar la auditoría del gestor de paquetes), preguntar primero (nuevos flujos de autenticación, nuevos datos sensibles, cambios de CORS o de subida de archivos) y no hacer nunca (hacer commit de secretos, registrar datos sensibles, confiar en la validación del lado del cliente). Cubre inyección, XSS, control de acceso (IDOR), sesiones, cabeceras de seguridad, CORS, subida de archivos, SSRF, operaciones destructivas sobre rutas derivadas, limitación de tasa, secretos, comprobaciones de dependencias y de la cadena de suministro, datos personales y privacidad, y funcionalidades de IA, donde la salida del modelo cuenta como entrada no confiable.

Resultado

Una lista priorizada de problemas con severidad, una versión corregida del código y notas sobre qué migrar o comprobar a continuación.

Ideal para

Cualquier persona que escriba o revise código que acepte entrada, gestione cuentas, almacene datos o llame a servicios de terceros. El paquete incluye la referencia de patrones y la lista de verificación de seguridad compartida a la que apunta la Skill.

Notas y riesgos

Riesgo bajo: instrucciones puras sin scripts. Indica al agente que edite tu código y ejecute la auditoría propia de tu gestor de paquetes, pero nunca que aplique correcciones forzadas automáticamente. Se hizo una ejecución de prueba con un controlador de ejemplo deliberadamente vulnerable: encontró 14 problemas y dio una versión corregida que no se ejecutó; el modelo no abrió los archivos de referencia en esa ejecución. Es orientación, no una auditoría de seguridad ni una garantía. La lista de verificación compartida se incluyó en el paquete y se corrigieron sus rutas para que las referencias se resuelvan. Por Addy Osmani, MIT.

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